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Abstract: Big Data is increasingly mined to rank and rate individuals. Predictive
algorithms assess whether we are good credit risks, desirable employees, reliable tenants,
valuable customers—or deadbeats, shirkers, menaces, and “wastes of time.” Crucial
opportunities are on the line, including the ability to obtain loans, work, housing, and
insurance. Though automated scoring is pervasive and consequential, it is also opaque and
lacking oversight. In one area where regulation does prevail—credit—the law focuses on
credit history, not the derivation of scores from data.
Procedural regularity is essential for those stigmatized by “artificially intelligent” scoring
systems. The American due process tradition should inform basic safeguards. Regulators
should be able to test scoring systems to ensure their fairness and accuracy. Individuals
should be granted meaningful opportunities to challenge adverse decisions based on scores
miscategorizing them. Without such protections in place, systems could launder biased and
arbitrary data into powerfully stigmatizing scores.
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[Jennifer is] ranked 1,396 out of 179,827 high school students
in Iowa. . . . Jennifer’s score is the result of comparing her test
results, her class rank, her school’s relative academic strength,
and a number of other factors. . . .
[C]an this be compared against all the other students in the
country, and maybe even the world? . . .
That’s the idea . . . .
That sounds very helpful. . . . And would eliminate a lot of doubt
and stress out there.
—Dave Eggers, The Circle 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCORED SOCIETY
In his novel The Circle, Dave Eggers imagines persistent surveillance
technologies that score people in every imaginable way. Employees
receive rankings for their participation in social media. 2 Retinal apps
allow police officers to see career criminals in distinct colors—yellow
for low-level offenders, orange for slightly more dangerous, but still
nonviolent offenders, and red for the truly violent. 3 Intelligence agencies
can create a web of all of a suspect’s contacts so that criminals’
associates are tagged in the same color scheme as the criminals
themselves. 4
Eggers’s imagination is not far from current practices. Although
predictive algorithms may not yet be ranking high school students
nationwide, or tagging criminals’ associates with color-coded risk
assessments, they are increasingly rating people in countless aspects of
their lives.
Consider these examples. Job candidates are ranked by what their
online activities say about their creativity and leadership.5 Software
engineers are assessed for their contributions to open source projects,

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 340–41 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 419–20.
Id. at 420.
See Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2013, at 72, 76.
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with points awarded when others use their code. 6 Individuals are
assessed as likely to vote for a candidate based on their cable-usage
patterns. 7 Recently released prisoners are scored on their likelihood of
recidivism. 8
How are these scores developed? Predictive algorithms mine personal
information to make guesses about individuals’ likely actions and risks.9
A person’s on- and offline activities are turned into scores that rate them
above or below others. 10 Private and public entities rely on predictive
algorithmic assessments to make important decisions about
individuals. 11
Sometimes, individuals can score the scorers, so to speak. Landlords
can report bad tenants to data brokers while tenants can check abusive
landlords on sites like ApartmentRatings.com. On sites like Rate My
Professors, students can score professors who can respond to critiques
via video. In many online communities, commenters can in turn rank the
interplay between the rated, the raters, and the raters of the rated, in an
effort to make sense of it all (or at least award the most convincing or
popular with points or “karma”). 12
Although mutual-scoring opportunities among formally equal subjects
exist in some communities, the realm of management and business more
often features powerful entities who turn individuals into ranked and
rated objects. 13 While scorers often characterize their work as an oasis of
6. See E. GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM 116–22 (2013) (exploring Debian open
source community and assessment of community members’ contributions).
7. See Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9,
2014, at 22, 22.
8. Danielle Keats Citron, Data Mining for Juvenile Offenders, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 21,
2010, 3:56 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/data-mining-for-juvenileoffenders.html.
9. Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 235, 235–36 (2011).
10. Hussein A. Abdou & John Pointon, Credit Scoring, Statistical Techniques and Evaluation
Criteria: A Review of the Literature, 18 INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS ACCT. FIN. & MGMT. 59, 60–61
(2011).
11. See Marwick, supra note 7, at 24; see also Jack Nicas, How Airlines Are Mining Personal
Data In-Flight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2013, at B1.
12. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2008) (“This structures [sic]
results in a bottom-up filtration system. At the lowest level, a large number of speakers receive
relatively broad exposure within local communities likely composed of individuals with highintensity interest or expertise. Speakers who gain salience at the lower levels may gradually gain
recognition in higher-order clusters and eventually reach general visibility.” (footnotes omitted)).
13. See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 108 (2014); JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A
GADGET (2010). For the distinction between management and community, see generally ROBERT
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opportunity for the hardworking, the following are examples of ranking
systems that are used to individuals’ detriment. A credit card company
uses behavioral-scoring algorithms to rate consumers’ credit risk
because they used their cards to pay for marriage counseling, therapy, or
tire-repair services. 14 Automated systems rank candidates’ talents by
looking at how others rate their online contributions. 15 Threat
assessments result in arrests or the inability to fly even though they are
based on erroneous information. 16 Political activists are designated as
“likely” to commit crimes. 17
And there is far more to come. Algorithmic predictions about health
risks, based on information that individuals share with mobile apps
about their caloric intake, may soon result in higher insurance
premiums. 18 Sites soliciting feedback on “bad drivers” may aggregate
the information, and could possibly share it with insurance companies
who score the risk potential of insured individuals. 19
The scoring trend is often touted as good news. Advocates applaud
the removal of human beings and their flaws from the assessment
process. Automated systems are claimed to rate all individuals in the
same way, thus averting discrimination. But this account is misleading.
Because human beings program predictive algorithms, their biases and
values are embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the
source code and predictive algorithms. 20 Scoring systems mine datasets
containing inaccurate and biased information provided by people. 21
POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, MANAGEMENT, COMMUNITY (1995).
14. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 35, FTC v. CompuCredit
Corp.,
No.
1:08-CV-1976-BBM
(N.D.
Ga.
June
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/06/080610compucreditcmptsigned.pdf.
15. Matt Ritchel, I Was Discovered by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013 (Sunday
Business), at 1.
16. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1444–45 (2011); David Gray & Danielle Keats
Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 81 (2013).
17. See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR
AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 104–05 (2012), available at
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=723145; Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the
Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 266
(2013).
18. See Marwick, supra note 7, at 24.
19. See Frank Pasquale, Welcome to the Panopticon, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 2, 2007),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/01/welcome_to_the_14.html.
20. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260–63
(2008).
21. Id.; Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 363–68
[hereinafter Citron, Open Code Governance].
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There is nothing unbiased about scoring systems.
Supporters of scoring systems insist that we can trust algorithms to
adjust themselves for greater accuracy. In the case of credit scoring,
lenders combine the traditional three-digit credit scores with “credit
analytics,” which track consumers’ transactions. Suppose creditanalytics systems predict that efforts to save money correlates with
financial distress. Buying generic products instead of branded ones could
then result in a hike in interest rates. But, the story goes, if consumers
who bought generic brands also purchased items suggesting their
financial strength, then all of their purchases would factor into their
score, keeping them from being penalized from any particular purchase.
Does everything work out in a wash because information is seen in its
totality? We cannot rigorously test this claim because scoring systems
are shrouded in secrecy. Although some scores, such as credit, are
available to the public, the scorers refuse to reveal the method and logic
of their predictive systems. 22 No one can challenge the process of
scoring and the results because the algorithms are zealously guarded
trade secrets. 23 As this Article explores, the outputs of credit-scoring
systems undermine supporters’ claims. Credit scores are plagued by
arbitrary results. They may also have a disparate impact on historically
subordinated groups.
Just as concerns about scoring systems are more acute, their human
element is diminishing. Although software engineers initially identify
the correlations and inferences programmed into algorithms, Big Data
promises to eliminate the human “middleman” at some point in the
process. 24 Once data-mining programs have a range of correlations and
inferences, they use them to project new forms of learning. The results
of prior rounds of data mining can lead to unexpected correlations in
click-through activity. If, for instance, predictive algorithms determine
not only the types of behavior suggesting loan repayment, but also
automate the process of learning which adjustments worked best in the
past, the computing process reaches a third level of sophistication:
determining which metrics for measuring past predictive algorithms
were effective, and recommending further iterations for testing. 25 In

22. Tal Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1512.
23. Evan Hendricks, Credit Reports, Credit Checks, Credit Scores, A.B.A. GPSOLO, July/Aug.
2011, at 32, 34.
24. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes Scientific Inquiry Obsolete,
WIRED (June 23, 2008), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory.
25. A pioneer of artificial intelligence described this process in more general terms: “In order for
a program to improve itself substantially it would have to have at least a rudimentary understanding
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short, predictive algorithms may evolve to develop an artificial
intelligence (AI) that guides their evolution.
The goals of AI are twofold. From an engineering perspective, AI is
the “science of making machines do things that would require
intelligence if done by” persons. 26 By contrast, the cognitive perspective
envisions AI as designing systems that work the way the human mind
does. 27 The distinct goals of the accounts of AI matter. The engineering
perspective aims to perform a certain task (e.g., to minimize defaults, as
in the credit context), regardless of how it does so. 28 This is the classic
“black box,” which converts inputs to outputs without revealing how it
does so. Alternatively, the cognitive perspective aspires for AI to
replicate human capacities, such as emotions and self-consciousness,
though often it falls short. 29 If scoring systems are to fulfill engineering
goals and retain human values of fairness, we need to create backstops
for human review.
Algorithmic scoring should not proceed without expert oversight.
This debate is already developing in the field of “killer robots,” where
military theorists have described the following distinctions in terms of
potentially autonomous, AI-driven weapons:
• Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select
targets and deliver force only with a human command;

of its own problem-solving process and some ability to recognize an improvement when it found
one. There is no inherent reason why this should be impossible for a machine.” Marvin L. Minsky,
Artificial Intelligence, SCI. AM., Sept. 1966, at 246, 260.
26. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY OF AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL
AGENTS 5 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. Ryan Calo has been a thought leader in integrating different conceptions of AI to
contemporary privacy problems and the field of robotics. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Robots and
Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187 (Patrick Lin
et al. eds., 2012); M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011); M. Ryan Calo,
Peeping Hals, 175 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 940 (2011).
28. Anderson, supra note 24.
29. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 26, at 5 (“There are two views of the goals of artificial
intelligence. From an engineering perspective, as Marvin Minsky noted, it is the ‘science of making
machines do things that would require intelligence if done by men.’ From a cognitive science
perspective, it is to design and build systems that work the way the human mind does. In the former
perspective, artificial intelligence is deemed successful along a performative dimension; in the
latter, along a theoretical one. The latter embodies Giambattista Vico’s perspective of verum et
factum convertuntur, ‘the true and the made are . . . convertible’; in such a view, artificial
intelligence would be reckoned the laboratory that validates our best science of the human mind.
This perspective sometimes shades into the claim artificial intelligence’s success lies in the
replication of human capacities such as emotions, the sensations of taste, and self-consciousness.
Here, artificial intelligence is conceived of as building artificial persons, not just designing systems
that are ‘intelligent.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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•

Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can select
targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human
operator who can override the robots’ actions; and
• Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that are
capable of selecting targets and delivering force without
any human input or interaction. 30
Human rights advocates and computer scientists contend that
“Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons” systems violate international law
because AI systems cannot adequately incorporate the rules of
distinction (“which requires armed forces to distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants”) and proportionality. 31 They create a
“responsibility gap” between commanders and killing machines. 32 Such
decisions arguably are the unique responsibility of persons using
holistic, non-algorithmic judgment to oversee complex and difficult
situations. 33
Just as automated killing machines violate basic legal norms,
stigmatizing scoring systems at the least should be viewed with caution.
We should not simply accept their predictions without understanding
how they came about, and assuring that some human reviewer can
respond to serious concerns about their fairness or accuracy.
Scoring systems are often assessed from an engineering perspective,
as a calculative risk management technology making tough but
ultimately technical rankings of populations as a whole. We call for the
integration of the cognitive perspective of AI. In this Article, we explore
the consequences to human values of fairness and justice when scoring
machines make judgments about individuals. Although algorithmic
predictions harm individuals’ life opportunities often in arbitrary and
discriminatory ways, they remain secret. 34 Human oversight is needed to
30. See Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Int’l Human
Rights Clinic, Harvard Law Sch., Cambridge, Mass.), Nov. 2012, at 2, available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf.
31. Id. at 30.
32. Id. at 42.
33. See JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO
CALCULATION 227 (1976) (insisting that we should not delegate to computers “tasks that demand
wisdom”). This is not to overstate the analogy of a low credit score to the kind of liberty deprivation
at stake in weaponry. The stakes of war are far greater than being sure that an individual can be
charged a higher interest rate. Nonetheless, under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
calculus familiar to all students of administrative and constitutional law, id. at 332–39, we should
not reject the targeting analogy as more-and-more predictive algorithms impact more-and-more
aspects of our lives.
34. On the importance of transparency and accountability in algorithms of powerful internet
intermediaries, see Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 12; Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and
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police these problems.
This Article uses credit scoring as a case study to take a hard look at
our scoring society more generally. Part II describes the development of
credit scoring and explores its problems. Evidence suggests that what is
supposed to be an objective aggregation and assessment of data—the
credit score—is arbitrary and has a disparate impact on women and
minorities. Critiques of credit scoring systems come back to the same
problem: the secrecy of their workings and growing influence as a
reputational metric. Scoring systems cannot be meaningfully checked
because their technical building blocks are trade secrets. Part III argues
that transparency of scoring systems is essential. It borrows from our due
process tradition and calls for “technological due process” to introduce
human values and oversight back into the picture. Scoring systems and
the arbitrary and inaccurate outcomes they produce must be subject to
expert review.
I.

CASE STUDY OF FINANCIAL RISK SCORING

Credit scores can make or break the economic fate of millions of
individuals. New York Times business reporter Joe Nocera observes that
while a “credit score is derived after an information-gathering process
that is anything but rigorous,” 35 it “[e]ssentially . . . has become the only
thing that matters anymore to the banks and other institutions that
underwrite mortgages.” 36 In this Part, we will provide a brief
background on credit scoring systems and explore their core problems.
A.

A (Very) Brief History of Credit Scoring Systems

Credit scoring in the United States has developed over six decades. 37
Initially, retail and banking staff assessed borrowers’ trustworthiness. 38
In time, experts were entrusted to make lending decisions. 39 After World

Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
105 (2010) [hereinafter Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition]; Frank Pasquale, Taking on
OPINIONS
(Aug.
12,
2007),
the
Known
Unknowns,
CONCURRING
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/08/taking_on_the_k.html.
35. Joe Nocera, Credit Score is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at B1.
36. Id. (reporting statement of Deb Killian, Board Member, National Association of Mortgage
Brokers).
37. Abdou & Pointon, supra note 10, at 59.
38. See ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S
ADDICTION TO CREDIT 83 (2000).
39. EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 1–15, 114–56, 358 (1930).
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War II, specialized finance companies entered the mix.40
In 1956, the firm Fair, Isaac & Co. (now known as FICO) devised a
three-digit credit score, promoting its services to banks and finance
companies. 41 FICO marketed its scores as predictors of whether
consumers would default on their debts. 42 FICO scores range from 300
to 850. FICO’s scoring system remains powerful, though credit bureaus
(“consumer reporting agencies”) 43 have developed their own scoring
systems as well. 44
Credit scores legitimated the complex securities at the heart of the
recent financial crisis. 45 In the mid-2000s, the credit score was the key
connecting ordinary U.S. homeowners with international capital
investors eager to invest in highly rated securities. 46 When investors
purchased a mortgage-backed security, they bought the right to a stream
of payments. 47 The mortgagor (borrower) shifted from paying the

40. Stan Sienkiewicz, Credit Cards and Payment Efficiency 3 (Aug. 2001) (unpublished
discussion
paper),
available
at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-andpayments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussionpapers/2001/PaymentEfficiency_092001.
pdf.
41. Martha Poon, Scorecards as Market Devices for Consumer Credit: The Case of Fair, Isaac &
Company Incorporated, 55 SOC. REV. MONOGRAPH 284, 288 (2007); Fair, Isaac and Company
History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Fair-Isaac-andCompany-Company-History.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
42. On predicting “derogatory events,” see The FICO Score, THECREDITSCORINGSITE,
http://www.creditscoring.com/creditscore/fico/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
43. For a definition of credit bureau, see Elkins v. Ocwen Federal Savings Bank Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., No. 06 CV 823, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84556, at *36–37 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 13, 2007) (explaining that credit bureaus and consumer reporting agencies regularly receive
updates on a consumer’s credit relationships from their data furnishers, such as banks, mortgage
companies, debt collectors, credit card issuers, department stores and others, and produce reports
that contain highly sensitive and personal details about a consumer’s finances, including account
numbers, loan balances, credit limits, and payment history).
44. A court case describes the fight between FICO and credit bureaus over the credit bureaus’
development of their own scoring systems. See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.,
645 F. Supp. 2d 734 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2011). In such cases, courts use
protective orders to ensure the confidentiality of trade secrets. See, e.g., Textured Yarn Co. v.
Burkart-Schier Chem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).
45. Martha Poon, From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial Consumer Risk
Scores and the Making of Subprime Mortgage Finance, 34 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y, 654, 662 (2009).
In 1995, government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced that borrowers
needed a credit score of at least 660 (on FICO’s scale of 300 to 850) for loans to qualify for the
status of “prime investment.” Id. at 663. Those below 660 were relegated to “subprime” offerings.
Id. at 664.
46. Id. at 655.
47. Chris Wilson, What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2008, 7:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/03/what_is_a_mortgagebacked_se
curity.html.
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original mortgagee (lender) to paying the purchaser of the mortgagebacked security, usually through a servicer. 48 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and networks of investors helped promote the credit score as a
“calculative risk management technolog[y].” 49
Pricing according to credit scores had a dark side. The credit score
moved the mortgage industry from “control-by-screening,” which aimed
to eliminate those who were unlikely to pay back their debts, to “controlby-risk characterized by a segmented accommodation of varying credit
qualities.” 50 Abuses piled up. Subprime-structured finance generated
enormous fees for middlemen and those with “big short” positions,
while delivering financial ruin to many end-purchasers of mortgagebacked securities and millions of homebuyers. 51
B.

The Problems of Credit Scoring

Long before the financial crisis, critics have questioned the fairness of
credit scoring systems. According to experts, the scores’ “black box”
assessments were “inevitably subjective and value-laden,” yet seemingly
“incontestable by the apparent simplicity of [a] single figure.” 52 There
are three basic problems with credit scoring systems: their opacity,
arbitrary results, and disparate impact on women and minorities.
1.

Opacity

Behind the three-digit score (whether a raw FICO score, or another
commercial credit score) is a process that cannot be fully understood,
challenged, or audited by the individuals scored or even by the
regulators charged with protecting them. Credit bureaus routinely deny
requests for details on their scoring systems. 53 No one outside the
scoring entity can conduct an audit of the underlying predictive
algorithms. 54 Algorithms, and even the median and average scores,
48. See Mortgage-Backed Securities, PIMCO (Feb. 2009), http://www.pimco.com/EN/Education/
Pages/MortgageBackedSecurities.aspx.
49. Poon, supra note 45, at 654.
50. Id. at 658 (emphasis omitted).
51. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
52. Donncha Marron, ‘Lending by Numbers’: Credit Scoring and the Constitution of Risk Within
American Consumer Credit, 36 ECON. & SOC’Y 103, 111 (2007). For another black-box analogy,
see Poon, supra note 45, at 658.
53. See Index of Letters, CREDITSCORING, http://www.creditscoring.com/letters/ (last visited Feb.
9, 2014) (documenting a series of letter requests and stonewalling responses). There have been
repeated efforts by the bureaus to resist mandatory disclosure, or even filing the models with states.
54. See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., No. 06-4112, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71187 (D. Minn.
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remain secret.
The lack of transparency of credit-scoring systems leaves consumers
confounded by how and why their scores change. 55 FICO and the credit
bureaus do not explain the extent to which individual behavior affects
certain categories. 56 Consumers cannot determine optimal credit
behavior or even what to do to avoid a hit on their scores.
FICO and credit bureaus do, however, announce the relative weight of
certain categories in their scoring systems. 57 For example, “credit
utilization” (how much of a borrower’s current credit lines are being
used) may be used. But the optimal credit utilization strategy is unclear.
No one knows whether, for instance, using twenty-five percent of one’s
credit limit is better or worse than using fifteen percent. An ambitious
consumer could try to reverse-engineer credit scores, but such efforts
would be expensive and unreliable. 58
As various rankings proliferate, so do uncertainties about one’s
standing. 59 Even the most conscientious borrower may end up surprised
by the consequences of his actions. Responding to the confusion, books,
articles, and websites offer advice on scoring systems. Amazon offers
dozens of self-help books on the topic, each capitalizing on credit
scoring’s simultaneously mystifying and meritocratic reputation.60
Hucksters abound in the cottage industry of do-it-yourself credit repair.
2.

Arbitrary Assessments
Credit-scoring systems produce arbitrary results, as demonstrated by

Sept. 25, 2007); see also Public Comment Letter from Greg Fisher, Creditscoring.com, to the Board
of
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
(Sept.
17,
2004),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2004/October/20041014/OP-1209/OP-1209_106_1.pdf.
55. Yuliya Demyanyk, Your Credit Score Is a Ranking, Not a Score, FED. RES. BANK
CLEVELAND (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/201016.cfm.
56. Credit Checks & Inquiries, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/
creditinquiries.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
57. See, e.g., What’s in My FICO Score?, MYFICO, http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/
WhatsInYourScore.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
58. See Dean Foust & Aaron Pressman, Credit Scores: Not-So-Magic Numbers, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-02-06/credit-scores-notso-magic-numbers.
59. See, e.g., Sue Kirchhoff & Sandra Block, Alternative Credit Scores Could Open Door for
Loans, USA TODAY (May 16, 2006, 10:01 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
perfi/credit/2006-05-16-credit-scores-usat_x.htm.
60. See, e.g., Owing! 5 Lessons on Surviving Your Debt Living in a Culture of Credit [Kindle
http://www.amazon.com/Lessons-Surviving-Living-Culture-CreditEdition],
AMAZON.COM,
ebook/dp/B00C2BMN3W (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
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the wide dispersion of credit scores set by the commercial credit
bureaus. 61 In a study of 500,000 files, 29% of consumers had credit
scores that differed by at least 50 points between the three credit
bureaus. 62 Barring some undisclosed, divergent aims of the bureaus,
these variations suggest a substantial proportion of arbitrary
assessments.
Evidencing their arbitrary nature, credit-scoring systems seemingly
penalize cardholders for their responsible behavior. 63 In 2010, a
movement called “Show Me the Note” urged homeowners to demand
that servicers prove they had legal rights to mortgage payments. 64 Given
the unprecedented level of foreclosure fraud, homeowners rightfully
wanted to know who owned the stream of payments due from their
mortgage. 65
A sensible credit-scoring system would reward those who had taken
the trouble to demand accurate information about their mortgage. 66 The
opposite, however, has happened. In one reported case, a homeowner
who followed all the instructions on the “Where’s the Note” website
allegedly experienced a “40 point hit” on his credit score. 67 In the
Kafkaesque world of credit scoring, merely trying to figure out possible
effects on one’s score can reduce it.
Of course, any particular case can be dismissed as an outlier, an
isolated complaint by an unfortunate person. But this example is the tip
of the iceberg. Over the past twenty years, a critical mass of complaints

61. Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C.
BANKING INST. 23, 41 (2006). Even after bureaus adopted the advanced “VantageScore” system,
“70% of the dispersion remains.” Peter Coy, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-03-14/giving-creditwhere-credit-is-duebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (“It has been
highly frustrating to lenders—and to borrowers—that the same person could get drastically different
credit scores from different bureaus.”).
62. Carter et al., supra note 61, at 41.
63. See, e.g., The Secret Score Behind Your Auto Insurance, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 2006, at 43
(noting that “insurance scores can penalize consumers who use credit reasonably”).
64. See, e.g., Mathew Hector, Standing, Securitization, and “Show Me the Note,” SULAIMAN
LAW GRP., http://www.sulaimanlaw.com/Publications/Standing-Securitization-and-Show-Me-TheNote.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
65. For background on foreclosure fraud, see generally YVES SMITH, WHISTLEBLOWERS REVEAL
HOW BANK OF AMERICA DEFRAUDED HOMEOWNERS AND PAID FOR A COVER UP—ALL WITH THE
HELP OF “REGULATORS” (2013).
66. Cf. Deltafreq, Comment to Where’s the Note? Leads BAC to Ding Credit Score, THE BIG
PICTURE (Dec. 14, 2010, 11:03 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/12/note-bac-credit-score/.
67. Barry Ritholtz, Where’s the Note? Leads BAC to Ding Credit Score, THE BIG PICTURE (Dec.
14, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/12/note-bac-credit-score/.
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about credit scoring has emerged. 68 Cassandra Jones Havard contends
that scoring models may play an integral role in discriminatory lending
practices. 69 Another commentator has charged that they enabled reckless
securitizations that had devastating systemic impact.70
In many accounts of the financial crisis, credit scores exerted a baleful
influence, rationalizing lending practices with ersatz quantification. As
Amar Bhide argued, the idea of “one best way” to rank credit applicants
flattened the distributed, varying judgment of local loan officers into the
nationwide credit score—a number focused on persons rather than
communities. 71 Like monocultural-farming technology vulnerable to one
unanticipated bug, the converging methods of credit assessment failed
spectacularly when macroeconomic conditions changed. The illusion of
commensurability and solid valuation provided by the models that
mortgage-based securities were based on helped spark a rush for what
appeared to be easy returns, exacerbating both boom and bust dynamics.
3.

Disparate Impact

Far from eliminating existing discriminatory practices, credit-scoring
algorithms instead grant them an imprimatur, systematizing them in
hidden ways. 72 Credit scores are only as free from bias as the software

68. See, e.g., Kevin Simpson, Insurers’ Use of Credit Reports Rankles Many, DENVER POST,
Aug. 20, 2003, at A1 (“Credit-scoring has been one of the components responsible for an ‘alarming
trend’ of increased complaints to regulators over the past three years . . . .”).
69. Cassandra Jones Havard, “On The Take”: The Black Box of Credit Scoring and Mortgage
Discrimination, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 241, 247 (2011) (arguing that credit scoring if unchecked is
an intrinsic, established form of discrimination very similar to redlining).
70. Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Credit Scoring and Trade Secrecy: An Algorithmic Quagmire or How
the Lack of Transparency in Complex Financial Models Scuttled the Finance Market, 12 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 87 (2011).
71. See generally AMAR BHIDE, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT: SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY (2010); Meredith Schramm-Strosser, The “Not So” Fair Credit Reporting Act: Federal
Preemption, Injunctive Relief, and the Need to Return Remedies for Common Law Defamation to
the States, 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 165, 169 (2012) (“A consumer’s reputation and credibility is
determined not by personal interactions with others in a small community, but by examining credit
files in an impersonal global world.”).
72. Havard, supra note 69, at 247 (arguing that “credit scoring if unchecked is an intrinsic,
established form of discrimination very similar to redlining”). Cf. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 16,
at 1459 (exploring how bias against groups can be embedded in fusion centers’ data-mining
algorithms and spread through the information sharing environment). The EEOC, in a lawsuit filed
against Kaplan, claimed that use of credit history would have a disparate, negative impact against
minority job applicants because of the lower average credit score of these groups. Press Release,
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Lawsuit Against
Kaplan Higher Education Corp. (Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/
release/12-21-10a.cfm.
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and data behind them. 73 Software engineers construct the datasets mined
by scoring systems; they define the parameters of data-mining analyses;
they create the clusters, links, and decision trees applied; 74 they generate
the predictive models applied. 75 The biases and values of system
developers and software programmers are embedded into each and every
step of development. 76
Beyond the biases embedded into code, some automated correlations
and inferences may appear objective but may reflect bias. Algorithms
may place a low score on occupations like migratory work or lowpaying service jobs. This correlation may have no discriminatory intent,
but if a majority of those workers are racial minorities, such variables
can unfairly impact consumers’ loan application outcomes. 77
To know for sure, we would need access to the source code,
programmers’ notes, and algorithms at the heart of credit-scoring
systems to test for human bias, which of course we do not have.78 Credit
bureaus may be laundering discrimination into black-boxed scores,
which are immune from scrutiny. 79
We are not completely in the dark though about credit scores’ impact.
Evidence suggests that credit scoring does indeed have a negative,
disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged groups. 80 Concerns
about disparate impact have led many states to regulate the use of credit

73. See SHAWN FREMSTAD & AMY TRAUB, DEMOS, DISCREDITING AMERICA: URGENT NEED TO
REFORM THE NATION’S CREDIT REPORTING INDUSTRY 11 (2011), available at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discrediting_America_Demos.pdf
(“[D]isparities in the credit reporting system mirror American society’s larger racial and economic
inequalities. [A] large body of research indicates that Americans with low incomes, and especially
African Americans and Latinos, are disproportionately likely to have low credit scores.”).
74. Zarsky, supra note 22, at 1518.
75. Id. at 1519.
76. Citron, supra note 20, at 1271 (discussing how administrative decision-making systems can
embed bias into programs that is then applied to countless cases).
77. Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring’s Effect on the Lending Industry, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 443, 445, 451–52 (2000).
78. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 70, at 91 (“As property, complex finance risk models often receive
intellectual property proprietary protection. These proprietary protections may take the form of
patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and sometimes trademarks.”).
79. Cf. Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
80. BIRNY BIRNBAUM, INSURERS’ USE OF CREDIT SCORING FOR HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE IN
OHIO: A REPORT TO THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION 2 (2003) (“Based upon all the available
information, it is our opinion that insurers’ use of insurance credit scoring for underwriting, rating,
marketing and/or payment plan eligibility very likely has a disparate impact on poor and minority
populations in Ohio.”).
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scores in insurance underwriting. 81 The National Fair Housing Alliance
(NFHA) has criticized credit scores for disadvantaging women and
minorities. 82
Insurers’ use of credit scores has been challenged in court for their
disparate impact on minorities. After years of litigation, Allstate agreed
to a multi-million dollar settlement over “deficiencies in Allstate’s credit
scoring procedure which plaintiffs say resulted in discriminatory action
against approximately five million African-American and Hispanic
customers.” 83 As part of the settlement, Allstate allowed plaintiffs’
experts to critique and refine future scoring models. 84
If illegal or unethical discrimination influences credit scoring,
members of disadvantaged groups will have difficulty paying their
bills. 85 Their late payments could be fed into credit scoring models as
neutral, objective indicia of reliability and creditworthiness.86 The very
benchmark against which discriminatory practices are measured may
indeed be influenced by discriminatory practices.
The paucity of enforcement activity makes it hard to assess the
effectiveness of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which
prohibits discrimination in lending, and Regulation B, which applies
ECOA to credit scoring systems. 87 Regulation B requires that the
reasons for a denial of credit/lending has to be related to—and
81. Credit-Based Insurance Scoring: Separating Facts from Fallacies, NAMIC POL’Y BRIEFING
(Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Indianapolis, Ind.), Feb. 2010, at 1, available at
http://iiky.org/documents/NAMIC_Policy_Briefing_on_Insurance_Scoring_Feb_2010.pdf.
82. The Future of Housing Finance: The Role of Private Mortgage Insurance: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 16 (2010) (statement of Deborah Goldberg, Hurricane Relief Program Director, The
National Fair Housing Alliance). The NFHA has expressed concern that “the use of credit scores
tends to disadvantage people of color, women, and others whose scores are often lower than those
of white borrowers.” Id. at 57. The NFHA has also expressed “growing concern about how useful
credit scores are for predicting loan performance and whether the financial sector is placing too
much reliance on credit scores rather than other risk factors such as loan terms.” Id.
83. Dehoyos v. Allstate, 240 F.R.D. 269, 275 (W.D. Tex. 2007). The parties settled after the Fifth
Circuit decided that federal civil rights law was not reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act’s allocation of insurance regulatory authority to states. See Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d
290, 299 (5th Cir. 2003). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which regulates lending
practices, does not preempt state laws that are stricter than ECOA.
84. Dehoyos, 240 F.R.D. at 276.
85. See, e.g., Gunter, supra note 77, at 451–52.
86. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007).
87. Regulation B sets forth specific data that cannot be used in a credit scoring system, such as:
public assistance status, likelihood that any person will bear or rear children, telephone listing,
income because of a prohibited basis, inaccurate credit histories, and different standards for married
and unmarried persons, race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (2013).
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accurately describe—the factors actually scored by the creditor. 88 Based
on the evidence we could uncover, cases are rare. 89 This is surely
because litigation costs usually exceed the discounted present value of
the monetary stakes involved. Fines and penalties probably are not large
enough to deter troubling practices. 90
C.

The Failure of the Current Regulatory Model

Contemporary problems echo concerns about unreliable credit
histories that prompted lawmakers to regulate the credit industry. 91 In
1970, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 92 “because
it was worried that growing databases [of personal information] could be
used in ways that were invisible and harmful to consumers.” 93 As
Priscilla Regan notes, the FCRA was the first information privacy
legislation in the United States. 94
The FCRA obligates credit bureaus and all other “consumer reporting
agencies” to ensure that credit histories are accurate and relevant.95
Consumers have the right to inspect their credit records, to demand
corrections, and to annotate their records if disputes cannot be
resolved. 96 From lawmakers, however, industry extracted a major
88. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2). Furthermore, no factor that was a principal reason for adverse action
may be excluded from the disclosure. Id.
89. See Scott Ilgenfritz, Commentary, The Failure of Private Actions as an ECOA Enforcement
Tool: A Call for Active Governmental Enforcement and Statutory Reform, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 447,
449 (1984) (“Despite congressional intent and the liberal relief provisions of the ECOA, there has
been a relative dearth of private actions brought under the Act.”).
90. Id.
91. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 319–20 (2004).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a–x (2012).
93. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology
Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy Challenges in the Era of Big Data: A View from the
Lifeguard’s
Chair
3
(Aug.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-dataview-lifeguard’s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf (transcript as prepared for delivery).
94. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 101 (1995).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (“Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it
shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”); see also id. § 1681a(f) (defining
consumer reporting agency). See generally Reddix-Smalls, supra note 70, at 108–09 (discussing the
history, purpose, and substance of the FCRA); The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the
Privacy of Your Credit Report, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/fcra/ (last
visited Feb. 22, 2014) (same).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (“Procedure in Case of Disputed Accuracy”).
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concession: immunity from defamation law. 97 By limiting the possible
penalties for reputational injuries, the FCRA opened the door to tactics
of stalling, obstinacy, and obfuscation by the credit industry. 98
What about credit scores? In 2003, the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA) required credit bureaus to disclose credit
scores to individuals in exchange for a fee capped by the FTC. But the
FACTA does not “require a consumer reporting agency to disclose to a
consumer any information concerning credit scores or any other risk
scores or predictors relating to the consumer,” 99 except for four “key
factors” involved in credit decisions. 100 Regrettably, those four factors
do little to explain credit scores. Phrases like “type of bank accounts”
and “type of credit references” are etiolated symbols, more suited for
machine-to-machine interaction than personal explanation. Factors such
as “too many revolving accounts” and “late payment” are commonplace
even for those with high credit scores. 101 The law does not require credit
scorers to tell individuals how much any given factor mattered to a
particular score. 102 Looking forward, a consumer has no idea, for
example, whether paying off a debt that is sixty days past due will raise
her score. The industry remains highly opaque, with scored individuals
unable to determine the exact consequences of their decisions.
Although FCRA offers individuals a chance to dispute items on their
credit history, it does not require credit bureaus to reveal the way they
convert a history into a score.103 That is a trade secret; a designation
offering powerful legal protections to companies that want to keep their
business practices a secret. 104 Despite such secrecy, we can draw some

97. SMITH, supra note 91, at 320. Note, though, that the FCRA is riddled with many exceptions,
exceptions to exceptions, and interactions with state law.
98. See Schramm-Strosser, supra note 71, at 170–71 (“What started out as an improvement over
how the common law dealt with credit-reporting issues has evolved into a regulatory scheme that
tends to favor the credit reporting industry . . . . One example of the FCRA’s overly broad
preemptive scope is the prohibition of injunctive relief for consumers who bring common law
defamation claims against CRAs.”).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)(B).
100. Id. § 1681g(f)(C).
101. Id.
102. Cf. Philip Morris v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the state could
require revelation of ingredients, but not how much of each was in the cigarettes). The tobacco
company in Reilly successfully raised a constitutional challenge, alleging the “taking” of a trade
secret. Id.
103. Credit histories appear on “consumer reports,” as defined by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d); Plaintiff’s Rule 26(a)(2) Expert Witness Report, Ellis v. Grant & Weber, 2006 WL
3338624 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2005) (No. CV-04-2007-CAS).
104. See Hendricks, supra note 23, at 34 (“Like the recipe for Coca-Cola, the precise formulas

05 - Citron & Pasquale Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

18

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/26/2014 2:47 PM

[Vol. 89:1

conclusions about the black box society that credit scoring is creating.
We have seen evidence that credit scores produce arbitrary results that
may in fact further entrench inequality.
Now, we turn to our proposals that aspire to bring procedural
regularity and regulatory oversight to our scored society, while
balancing the protection of other values, including the intellectual
property of the developers of scoring technology. 105
II.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR AUTOMATED SCORING
SYSTEMS

Predictive scoring may be an established feature of the Information
Age, but it should not continue without check. Meaningful
accountability is essential for predictive systems that sort people into
“wheat” and “chaff,” “employable” and “unemployable,” “poor
candidates” and “hire away,” and “prime” and “subprime” borrowers.
Procedural regularity is essential given the importance of predictive
algorithms to people’s life opportunities—to borrow money, work,
travel, obtain housing, get into college, and far more. Scores can become
self-fulfilling prophecies, creating the financial distress they claim
merely to indicate. 106 The act of designating someone as a likely credit
risk (or bad hire, or reckless driver) raises the cost of future financing (or
work, or insurance rates), increasing the likelihood of eventual
insolvency or un-employability. 107 When scoring systems have the
potential to take a life of their own, contributing to or creating the
situation they claim merely to predict, it becomes a normative matter,
requiring moral justification and rationale. 108
used to calculate various kinds of credit scores are well-guarded trade secrets.”).
105. For an in-depth exploration of the different ways private and public decisions have been
hidden to our detriment, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (forthcoming
2014).
106. See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: The Banking Industry’s Attack on
Disparate Impact Race Discrimination Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2008) (“Ironically, because these borrowers are more
likely to default on their loans, the banks, to compensate for that increased risk, issue these
borrowers loans that feature more onerous financial obligations, thus increasing the likelihood of
default.”).
107. See id.
108. This is part of a larger critique of economic thought as a “driver,” rather than a “describer,”
of financial trends. See generally DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW
FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE MARKETS (2006) (describing how economic theorists of finance helped
create modern derivative markets); Joel Isaac, Tangled Loops: Theory, History, and the Human
Sciences in Modern America, 6 MOD. INTELL. HIST. 397, 420 (2009) (“[S]cholars are rejecting the
traditional notion that economics attempts to create freestanding representations of market processes
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Scoring systems should be subject to fairness requirements that reflect
their centrality in people’s lives. Private scoring systems should be as
understandable to regulators as to firms’ engineers. However well an
“invisible hand” coordinates economic activity generally speaking,
markets depend on reliable information about the practices of firms that
finance, rank, and rate consumers. Brandishing quasi-governmental
authority to determine which individuals are worthy of financial
backing, private scoring systems need to be held to a higher standard
than the average firm.
One of the great accomplishments of the legal order was holding the
sovereign accountable for decisionmaking and giving subjects basic
rights, in breakthroughs stretching from Runnymede to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 to the American Revolution. New algorithmic
decisionmakers are sovereign over important aspects of individual lives.
If law and due process are absent from this field, we are essentially
paving the way to a new feudal order of unaccountable reputational
intermediaries. 109
How should we accomplish accountability? Protections could draw
insights from what one of us has called “technological due process”—
procedures ensuring that predictive algorithms live up to some standard
of review and revision to ensure their fairness and accuracy. 110
Procedural protections should apply not only to the scoring algorithms
themselves (a kind of technology-driven rulemaking), but also to
individual decisions based on algorithmic predictions (technology-driven
adjudication).
This is not to suggest that full due process guarantees are required as
a matter of current law. Given the etiolated state of “state action”
(which economic sociologists must then insist leaves out power, or cultural context, or the fullness
of human agency).”). Some commentators have argued that we need to “recognize economics not as
a (misguided) science of capitalism but as its technology, that is, as one of the active ingredients in
the production and reproduction of the market order.” Marion Fourcade, Theories of Markets and
Theories of Society, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1015, 1025 (2007).
109. Our proposal for basic rights of citizens vis-á-vis scoring systems also finds support in the
work of other scholars concerned about the extraordinary power of private companies. See, e.g.,
LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE
DEATH OF PRIVACY 189–91 (2012) (concluding with a proposal for a “Social Network
Constitution”); REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 240–41 (2012) (proposing
ten principles of network governance); Jeffrey Rosen, Madison’s Privacy Blind Spot, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2014 (Sunday), at 5 (“What Americans may now need is a constitutional amendment to
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of our persons and electronic effects, whether by the
government or by private corporations like Google and AT&T. . . . [O]ur rights to enjoy liberty, and
to obtain happiness and safety at the same time, are threatened as much by corporate as government
surveillance.”).
110. See generally Citron, supra note 20.
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doctrine in the United States, FICO and credit bureaus are not state
actors; however, much of their business’s viability depends on the
complex web of state supports and rules surrounding housing finance.
Nonetheless, the underlying values of due process—transparency,
accuracy, accountability, participation, and fairness 111—should animate
the oversight of scoring systems given their profound impact on people’s
lives. Scholars have built on the “technological due process” model to
address private and public decision-making about individuals based on
the mining of Big Data. 112
We offer a number of strategies in this regard. Federal regulators,
notably the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), should be given full
access to credit-scoring systems so that they can be reviewed to protect
against unfairness. Our other proposals pertain to individual decisionmaking based on algorithmic scores. Although our recommendations
focus on credit scoring systems, they can extend more broadly to other
predictive algorithms that have an unfair impact on consumers.
A.

Regulatory Oversight over Scoring Systems

The first step toward reform will be to clearly distinguish between
steps in the scoring process, giving scored individuals different rights at
different steps. These steps include:
1) Gathering data about scored individuals;
2) Calculating the gathered data into scores;
3) Disseminating the scores to decisionmakers, such as employers;
4) Employers’ and others’ use of the scores in decisionmaking.
We believe that the first step, data gathering, should be subject to the
same strictures as FCRA—whatever the use of the data—once a firm has
gathered data on more than 2,000 individuals. 113 Individuals should have
the right to inspect, correct, and dispute inaccurate data, and to know the
sources (furnishers) of the data. Ironically, some data brokers now refuse
to give out their data sources because of “confidentiality agreements”

111. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicator, Independence, and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 478–89 (1986).
112. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (relying on a “technological
due process” model to address Big Data’s predictive privacy harms), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/429/; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of
Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2013) (calling for a “technological due process”
solution to governmental and corporate decision-making by Big Data predictions).
113. This number is meant to permit small businesses’ consumer research to be unregulated; we
are open to suggestion as to whether the number should be higher or lower.
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with sources. 114 That position (hiding behind privacy interests to violate
consumer privacy) would not stand for consumer reporting agencies
covered by FCRA. It should not stand for data brokers and the like.
Second, at the calculation of data stage, ideally such calculations
would be public, and all processes (whether driven by AI or other
computing) would be inspectable. In some cases, the trade secrets may
merit protection, and only a dedicated, closed review should be
available. But in general, we need to switch the default in situations like
this away from an assumption of secrecy, and toward the expectation
that people deserve to know how they are rated and ranked.
The third stage is more difficult, as it begins to implicate First
Amendment issues. Given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc. 115 and other rulings in cases involving the regulation of
ranking systems, 116 courts may look askance at rules that limit the
dissemination of data or scores. 117 Nevertheless, scored individuals
should be notified when scores or data are communicated to an entity.
That notification only increases speech; it does not restrict or censor
communication. Coerced speech can implicate the First Amendment, but
like Professor Neil Richards, we do not understand Sorrell to lay down a
blanket rule that all data is speech. 118 Transparency requirements are
consistent with First Amendment doctrine.
The fourth and final stage is the most controversial. We believe that—
given the sensitivity of scoring and their disparate impact on vulnerable
populations—scoring systems should be subject to licensing and audit
requirements when they enter critical settings like employment,
114. Casey Johnston, Data Brokers Won’t Even Tell the Government How It Uses, Sells Your
Data, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/12/databrokers-wont-even-tell-the-government-how-it-uses-sells-your-data/.
115. __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
116. See, e.g., Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition, supra note 34, at 117–19
(discussing the successful First Amendment defense of the Avvo lawyer ratings site).
117. Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–72 (holding that drug companies have a constitutional right to
access certain types of data without undue state interference); see also NEIL M. RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND INFORMATION IN A DIGITAL AGE ch. 5
(forthcoming 2014) (exploring why Sorrell does not lay down a blanket rule that all data is speech
for purposes of the First Amendment and more narrowly rested on concerns about viewpoint
discrimination among other reasons). For a critical description of the stakes of Sorrell, see David
Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 74, 81 (2010) (“When people develop relationships with their physicians and pharmacists,
they are entitled to the assurance that information about their medical condition will be used for
their benefit and not to place their health at risk or to increase their health care costs.”); Frank
Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 740 (2013); Andrew Tutt, Software
Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 75 (2012).
118. See RICHARDS, supra note 117, at ch. 5.
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insurance, and health care. Such licensing could be completed by private
entities that are themselves licensed by the EEOC, OSHA, or the
Department of Labor. 119 This “licensing at one remove” has proven
useful in the context of health information technology. 120
Given scoring’s sensitivity, fair, accurate, and replicable use of data is
critical. We cannot rely on companies themselves to “self-regulate”
toward this end—they are obligated merely to find the most efficient
mode of processing, and not to vindicate other social values including
fairness. Licensing can serve as a way of assuring that public values
inform this technology.
Licensing entities could ensure that particularly sensitive data does
not make it into scoring. For example, data brokers sell the names of
parents whose child was killed in car crash, 121 of rape victims, 122 and of
AIDS patients. 123 Licensors could assure that being on such a list does
not influence scoring. Public hearings could be held on other, troubling
categories to gather input on whether they should be used for
decisionmaking. Data brokers pigeonhole individuals on the basis of
who-knows-what data and inferences. Before letting such monikers
become de facto scarlet letters,124 we need to have a broader societal
conversation on the power wielded by data brokers and, particularly, the
level of validity of such classifications.
Many of our proposals would require legislation. We are under no
illusions that Congress is presently inclined to promote them. However,
as in the case of the massive health IT legislation of 2009 (HITECH), it
is important to keep proposals “ready to hand” for those brief moments
of opportunity when change can occur. 125
119. For a relevant case regarding the potentially discriminatory impact of a scoring system or its
use, see EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287, 298 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Regarding] the low score on
the Customer Service Assessment she had completed as part of the application process[, the
manager] noted from the Customer Service Assessment that Charging Party potentially might be
less inclined to deliver great customer service.”).
120. Frank Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014).
121. See Kashmir Hill, OfficeMax Blames Data Broker for ‘Daughter Killed in Car Crash’
Letter, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 12:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2014/01/22/officemax-blames-data-broker-for-daughter-killed-in-car-crash-letter/.
122. Amy Merrick, A Death in the Database, NEW YORKER (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2014/01/ashley-seay-officemax-car-crash-deathin-the-database.html.
123. Id.
124. Frank A. Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115,
122 (2006).
125. This is commonly known as the “garbage can” theory of political change—rather than being
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Fortunately, the Federal Trade Commission does have statutory
authority to move forward on several parts of the “scored society”
agenda. The FTC can oversee credit-scoring systems under its authority
to combat “unfair” trade practices under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 126 It can use this authority to develop much more
robust oversight over credit scoring, which could then be a model for
legislation for other scoring entities (or for state consumer protection
authorities and state attorneys general with authority to promote fair
information practices).
“Unfair” commercial practices involve conduct that substantially
harms consumers, or threatens to substantially harm consumers, which
consumers cannot reasonably avoid, and where the harm outweighs the
benefits. 127 In 2008, the FTC invoked its unfairness authority against a
credit provider for basing credit reductions on an undisclosed behavioral
scoring model that penalized consumers for using their credit cards for
certain transactions, such as personal counseling. 128
The FTC’s concerns about predictive algorithms have escalated with
their increasing use. In March 2014, the FTC is hosting a panel of
experts to discuss the private sector’s use of algorithmic scores to make
decisions about individuals, including individuals’ credit risk with
certain transactions, likelihood to take medication, and influence over
others based on networked activities.129 The FTC has identified the
following topics for discussion:
• How are companies utilizing these predictive scores?
• How accurate are these scores and the underlying data

rationally planned, most legislative efforts depend on whatever plans are at hand. J. Bendor et al.,
Recycling the Garbage Can: An Assessment of the Research Program, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 95,
169 (2001).
126. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). See generally A Brief
Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last updated July
2008).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012).
128. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief Against Defendant
CompuCredit Corp., FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-CV-1976-BBM-RGV (N.D. Ga. Dec.
19,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/12/
081219compucreditstiporder.pdf. For a compelling account of the crucial role that the FTC plays in
regulating unfair consumer practices and establishing a common law of privacy, see Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312913 (last updated Oct. 29, 2013).
129. See Spring Privacy Series: Alternative Scoring Products, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/spring-privacy-series-alternative-scoringproducts (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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used to create them?
• How can consumers benefit from the availability and
use of these scores?
• What are the privacy concerns surrounding the use of
predictive scoring?
• What consumer protections should be provided; for
example, should consumers have access to these scores
and the underlying data used to create them?
• Should some of these scores be considered eligibility
determinations that should be scrutinized under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act? 130
FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has voiced her concerns about
algorithms that judge individuals “not because of what they’ve done, or
what they will do in the future, but because inferences or correlations
drawn by algorithms suggest they may behave in ways that make them
poor credit or insurance risks, unsuitable candidates for employment or
admission to schools or other institutions, or unlikely to carry out certain
functions.” 131 In her view, predictive correlations amount to
“arbitrariness-by-algorithm” for mischaracterized consumers. 132
Indeed, as Chairwoman Ramirez powerfully argues, decisions-byalgorithm require “transparency, meaningful oversight and procedures to
remediate decisions that adversely affect individuals who have been
wrongly categorized by correlation.” 133 Companies must “ensure that by
using big data algorithms they are not accidently classifying people
based on categories that society has decided—by law or ethics—not to
use, such as race, ethnic background, gender, and sexual orientation.” 134
With Chairwoman Ramirez’s goals in mind and the FTC’s unfairness
authority, the FTC should move forward in challenging credit-scoring
systems. The next step is figuring out the practicalities of such
enforcement. How can the FTC translate these aspirations into reality
given that scoring systems are black boxes even to regulators?
1.

Transparency to Facilitate Testing

The FTC should be given access to credit-scoring systems and other
scoring systems that unfairly harm consumers. Access could be more or
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Ramirez, supra note 93, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
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less episodic depending on the extent of unfairness exhibited by the
scoring system. Biannual audits would make sense for most scoring
systems; more frequent monitoring would be necessary for those which
had engaged in troubling conduct. 135
We should be particularly focused on scoring systems which rank and
rate individuals who can do little or nothing to protect themselves. The
FTC’s expert technologists 136 could test scoring systems for bias,
arbitrariness, and unfair mischaracterizations. To do so, they would need
to view not only the datasets mined by scoring systems 137 but also the
source code and programmers’ notes describing the variables,
correlations, and inferences embedded in the scoring systems’
algorithms. 138
For the review to be meaningful in an era of great technological
change, the FTC’s technical experts must be able to meaningfully assess
systems whose predictions change pursuant to AI logic. They should
permitted to test systems to detect patterns and correlations tied to
classifications that are already suspect under American law, such as race,
nationality, sexual orientation, and gender. Scoring systems should be
run through testing suites that run expected and unexpected hypothetical
scenarios designed by policy experts. 139 Testing reflects the norm of
proper software development, and would help detect both programmers’
potential bias and bias emerging from the AI system’s evolution. 140
2.

Risk Assessment Reports and Recommendations
Once

the

FTC

evaluates

credit-scoring

systems

to

detect

135. See Helen Nissenbaum, Accountability in a Computerized Society, 2 SCI. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 25, 37 (1996) (describing commentators’ calls for “simpler design, a modular approach to
system building, meaningful quality assurance, independent auditing, built-in redundancy, and
excellent documentation”).
136. The FTC’s Senior Technologist position has been filled by esteemed computer scientists
Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University, Professor Steven Bellovin of Columbia
University, and now by Professor LaTanya Sweeney of Harvard University.
137. See, e.g., Zarsky, supra note 22, at 1520.
138. We thank Ed Felten for suggesting that oversight of automated systems include access to
programmers’ notes for the purpose of assessing source code. Ed Felten, Comment to Danielle
Citron, Technological Due Process Lecture at Princeton University Center on Information
Technology Policy Lecture Series (Apr. 30, 2009); see also Danielle Citron: Technological Due
Process, CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. POL’Y, https://citp.princeton.edu/event/citron/ (last visited Feb. 11,
2014). The question we shall soon address is whether the public generally and affected individuals
specifically should also have access to the data sets and logic behind predictive algorithms.
139. Citron, supra note 20, at 1310.
140. Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems, 14 ACM TRANSACTIONS
ON INFO. SYSTEMS 330, 334 (1996).
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“arbitrariness-by-algorithm”—as Chairwoman Ramirez astutely puts
it—it should issue a Privacy and Civil Liberties Impact Assessment
evaluating a scoring system’s negative, disparate impact on protected
groups, arbitrary results, mischaracterizations, and privacy harms. 141 In
those assessments, the FTC could identify appropriate risk mitigation
measures.
An important question is the extent to which the public should have
access to the data sets and logic of predictive credit-scoring systems. We
believe that each data subject should have access to all data pertaining to
the data subject. Ideally, the logics of predictive scoring systems should
be open to public inspection as well. There is little evidence that the
inability to keep such systems secret would diminish innovation. The
lenders who rely on such systems want to avoid default—that in itself is
enough to incentivize the maintenance and improvement of such
systems. There is also not adequate evidence to give credence to
“gaming” concerns—i.e., the fear that once the system is public,
individuals will find ways to game it. While gaming is a real concern in
online contexts, where, for example, a search engine optimizer could
concoct link farms to game Google or other ranking algorithms if the
signals became public, the signals used in credit evaluation are far
costlier to fabricate. 142 Moreover, the real basis of commercial success in
“big data” driven industries is likely the quantity of relevant data
collected in the aggregate—something not necessarily revealed or
shared via person-by-person disclosure of data held and scoring
algorithms used.
We must also ensure that academics and other experts can comment
on such scoring systems. Kenneth Bamberger and Deidre Mulligan
argue that Privacy Impact Assessments required by the E-Government
Act are unsuccessful in part due to the public’s inability to comment on
the design of systems whose specifications and source codes remain
obscured. 143
141. Zarsky, supra note 22, at 1529; see also Citron, Open Code Governance, supra note 21, at
370–71 (exploring the untapped potential of federally required Privacy Impact Assessments). For
example, the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security is
required to draft Civil Liberties Impact Assessments in response to new programs and policies
impacting minorities. Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments (last visited Feb. 11,
2014).
142. They are, in this sense, more likely to be “honest signals,” and we should not expend a great
deal of effort to assure their integrity without stronger evidence that they are likely to be
compromised. See, e.g., SANDY PENTLAND, HONEST SIGNALS (2010).
143. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deidre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 81–82, 88–89 (2008). Twelve percent of agencies do not have
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As Tal Zarsky argues, the public could be informed about the datasets
that predictive systems mine without generating significant social
risks. 144 Zarsky demonstrates that—when it comes to “the collection of
data and aggregation of datasets”—it is evident that “providing
information regarding the kinds and forms of data and databases used in
the analysis . . . generate[s] limited social risks . . . [usually only in the
context of] secretive governmental datasets.” 145
The more difficult question concerns whether scoring systems’ source
code, algorithmic predictions, and modeling should be transparent to
affected individuals and ultimately the public at large. Neil Richards and
Jonathan King astutely explain that “there are legitimate arguments for
some level of big data secrecy,” including concerns “connected to highly
sensitive intellectual property and national security assets.” 146 But these
concerns are more than outweighed by the threats to human dignity
posed by pervasive, secret, and automated scoring systems. At the very
least, individuals should have a meaningful form of notice and a chance
to challenge predictive scores that harm their ability to obtain credit,
jobs, housing, and other important opportunities.
B.

Protections for Individuals

In constructing strategies for technological due process in scoring
contexts, it is helpful to consider the sort of notice individuals are owed
when governmental systems make adverse decisions about them. Under
the Due Process Clause, notice must be “reasonably calculated” to
inform individuals of the government’s claims against them. 147 The
sufficiency of notice depends upon its ability to inform affected
individuals about the issues to be decided, the evidence supporting the
government’s position, and the agency’s decisional process. 148 Clear
notice decreases the likelihood that agency action will rest upon
“incorrect or misleading factual premises or on the misapplication of
rules.” 149
written processes or policies for all listed aspects of Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) and sixteen
percent of systems covered by the PIA requirement did not have a complete or current PIA. Id. at
81.
144. Zarsky, supra note 22, at 1524 (exploring the practical and normative implications of
varying kinds of transparency for governmental predictive systems).
145. Id.
146. Richards & King, supra note 112, at 43.
147. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002).
148. JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 176 (1985).
149. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
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Notice problems have plagued agency decision-making systems.
Automated systems administering public benefits programs have
terminated or reduced people’s benefits without any explanation. 150 That
is largely because system developers failed to include audit trails that
record the facts and law supporting every decision made by the
computer. 151 Technological due process insists that automated systems
include immutable audit trails to ensure that individuals receive notice of
the basis of decisions against them. 152
1.

Notice Guaranteed by Audit Trails

Aggrieved consumers could be guaranteed reasonable notice if
scoring systems included audit trails recording the correlations and
inferences made algorithmically in the prediction process. With audit
trails, individuals would have the means to understand their scores. They
could challenge mischaracterizations and erroneous inferences that led to
their scores.
Even if scorers successfully press to maintain the confidentiality of
their proprietary code and algorithms vis-à-vis the public at large, it is
still possible for independent third parties to review it. One possibility is
that in any individual adjudication, the technical aspects of the system
could be covered by a protected order requiring their confidentiality.
Another possibility is to limit disclosure of the scoring system to trusted
neutral experts. 153 Those experts could be entrusted to assess the
inferences and correlations contained in the audit trails. They could
assess if scores are based on illegitimate characteristics such as race,
nationality, or gender or on mischaracterizations. This possibility would
both protect scorers’ intellectual property and individuals’ interests.
2.

Interactive Modeling

Another approach would be to give consumers the chance to see what
happens to their score with different hypothetical alterations of their

150. Citron, supra note 20, at 1276–77.
151. Id. at 1277 (describing automated public benefits systems that failed to include audit trails
and how thus the systems were “unable to generate transaction histories showing the ‘decisions with
respect to each eligibility criterion for each type of assistance’ in individual cases”).
152. Id. at 1305. Immutable audit trails are essential so that the record-keeping function of audit
trails cannot be altered. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 16, at 1472.
153. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 62 (2001); Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition, supra note
34, at 162.
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credit histories. Imagine an interface where each aspect of a person’s
credit history is represented on a wiki. 154 To make it more concrete,
picture a consumer who is facing a dilemma. She sees on her credit
report that she has a bill that is thirty days overdue. She could secure a
payday loan to pay the bill, but she’d face a usurious interest rate if she
takes that option. She can probably earn enough money working
overtime to pay the bill herself in forty days. Software could give her an
idea of the relative merits of either course. If her score dropped by 100
points when a bill went unpaid for a total of sixty days, she would be
much more likely to opt for the payday loan than if a mere five points
were deducted for that term of delinquency.
Just as the authors of the children’s series Choose Your Own
Adventure helped pave the way to the cornucopia of interactive
entertainment now offered today, 155 so, too, might creative customer
relations demystify credit scoring. Interactive modeling, known as
“feedback and control,” has been successfully deployed in other
technical contexts by a “values in design” movement. 156 It has promoted
automated systems that give individuals more of a sense of how future
decisions will affect their evaluation. For example, Canada’s
Immigration Bureau lets individuals enter various scenarios into a
preliminary “test” for qualification as a permanent resident. 157 The
digital interface allows users to estimate how different decisions will
affect their potential to become a Canadian citizen. Learning French or
earning a graduate degree can be a great help to those in their thirties; on
the other hand, some over sixty years old can do “everything right” and
still end up with too few points to apply successfully. The public
scorecard does not guarantee anyone admittance, and is revised over
time. Nevertheless, it provides a rough outline of what matters to the
scoring process, and how much.

154. For general information on wikis, see Daniel Nations, What is a Wiki?, ABOUT.COM,
http://webtrends.about.com/od/wiki/a/what_is_a_wiki.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
155. Grady Hendrix, Choose Your Own Adventure, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2011, 7:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2282786/.
156. Comments of Deirdre K. Mulligan, Professor, Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley & Nicholas P.
Doty in Response to the National Telecommunications & Information Administration’s Request for
Comments on the Multistakeholder Process To Develop Consumer Data Privacy Codes of Conduct,
Docket
No.
120214135-2135-01,
at
11
(May
18,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mulligan_doty_comments.pdf.
See
generally
HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE
(2010); PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 67 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008).
157. Determine Your Eligibility — Federal Skilled Workers, GOV’T OF CANADA,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-who.asp (last updated June 20, 2013).
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Credit bureaus do need some flexibility to assess a rapidly changing
financial environment. Any given score may be based on hundreds of
shifting variables; a default may be much less stigmatizing in a year of
mass foreclosures than in flush times. Credit bureaus may not be capable
of predicting exactly how any given action will be scored in a week, a
month, or a year. Nevertheless, they could easily “run the numbers” in
old versions of the scoring software, letting applicants know how a given
decision would have affected their scores on, for example, three different
dates in the past.
We need innovative ways to regulate the scoring systems used in the
finance, insurance, and real estate industries, and perhaps might even
consider a “public option” in credit scoring. Even if it were first only
tried in an experimental set of loans, it could do a great deal of good. If a
public system could do just as well as a private one, it would seriously
deflate industry claims that scoring needs to be secretive—a topic
explore in more depth in the next section.
C.

Objections

Credit bureaus will object that transparency requirements—of any
stripe—would undermine the whole reason for credit scores. Individuals
could “game the system” if information about scoring algorithms were
made public or leaked in violation of protective orders. 158 Scored
consumers would have ammunition to cheat, hiding risky behavior and
routing around entities’ legitimate concerns such as fraud.
We concede that incidental indicators of good credit can become
much less powerful predictors if everyone learns about them. If it were
to become widely known that, say, the optimal number of credit
accounts is four, those desperate for a loan may be most likely to alter
their financial status to conform with this norm.
However, we should also ask ourselves, as a society, whether this
method of judging and categorizing people—via a secretive, panoptic
158. Odysseas Papadimitriou, Occupy Wall Street & Credit Score Reform, WALLETBLOG (Mar.
21, 2012), http://www.walletblog.com/2012/03/credit-score-reform/ (“[T]he Occupiers are off-base
in suggesting that we centralize credit scoring and make the underlying formulas public. This would
only make it easier for people to game the system, which would make existing credit scores less
useful to banks and lead more of them to create their own proprietary scores that consumers would
have no way of accessing.”). But bureaus may have more “economic” incentives to keep their
methods hidden. See Eric Pitter, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Credit Scoring
Implications of the Amended Bankruptcy Code—and How Bankruptcy Lawyers Can Help, 61
CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 61, 65 (2007) (“CRAs have refused to disclose their credit scoring
formula to anyone, even the Federal Reserve Board. The CRAs’ full exclusivity of their credit
scoring model protects their niche and their unique role in the credit markets.”).
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sort—is appropriate. It has already contributed to one of the greatest
financial crises in American history, legitimizing widespread subprime
lending by purporting to scientifically rank individuals’ creditworthiness
with extraordinary precision. Secretive credit scoring can needlessly
complicate the social world, lend a patina of objectivity to dangerous
investment practices, and encode discriminatory practices in
impenetrable algorithms. 159
The benefits of secrecy are murkier than these costs. Moreover, the
secrecy of credit scoring can impede incremental innovation: how can
outsiders develop better scoring systems if they have no way of
accessing current ones? Secret credit scoring can undermine the public
good, since opaque methods of scoring make it difficult for those who
feel—and quite possibly are—wronged to press their case.
If scorers can produce evidence about the bad effects of publicity, that
might justify keeping the correlations, inferences, and logic of scoring
algorithms from the public at large. But that logic would not apply to the
FTC or third-party experts who would be bound to keep proprietary
information confidential.
Another objection is that our proposal only works when the very
existence of scoring systems is public knowledge, as in the case of credit
scores. In non-credit contexts, entities are under no legal obligation to
disclose scoring systems to the public generally and to impacted
individuals specifically. Some scoring systems are not a secret because
their business model is the sale of scores to private and public entities.
Data brokers, for instance, rank, categorize, and score consumers on
non-credit bases so they can avoid the obligations of FCRA. 160
To be sure, it is impossible to challenge a scoring system that
consumers do not even know exists. Secret scores about people’s health,
employability, habits, and the like may amount to unfair practices even
though they fall outside the requirements of FCRA. In that case, the FTC
would have authority to require entities to disclose hidden scoring
systems.
159. Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Debt Market Liquidity 17–19 (Ctr. on Capitalism &
Soc’y,
Columbia
Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
79,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206996.
160. Pam Dixon, Exec. Dir., World Privacy Forum, Testimony Before Senate Committee on
Commerce Science and Transportation: What Information Do Data Brokers Have On Consumers,
and How Do They Use It? 3 (Dec. 18, 2013), available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/WPF_PamDixon_CongressionalTestimony_DataBrokers_2013_fs.pdf. For
a discussion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act model, see Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation:
Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely Commensurating Computing, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET 107, 111–12 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
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Of course, scoring systems that remain secret would be difficult for
the FTC to identify and interrogate. Lawmakers could insist upon the
transparency of scoring systems that impact important life opportunities.
California, for instance, has been at the forefront of efforts to improve
the transparency of businesses’ use of consumer information. 161 The
FTC has called upon federal lawmakers to pass legislation giving
consumers access to the information that data brokers hold about
them. 162 In September 2013, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman
Jay Rockefeller announced his committee’s investigation of the
information collection and sharing practices of top data brokers. 163 We
are particularly supportive of such efforts—scoring systems can only be
meaningfully assessed if they are known and subject to challenge.
CONCLUSION
Imagine a young woman who failed to get a job out of college, and
that failure reduced her “employability” score used by potential
employers to determine her fitness for work. She found part-time work
at a fast food restaurant. Her credit score fell far below 600 without her
even knowing it, perhaps because of inferences associated with certain
low-paying jobs. Her low credit score caused further bad outcomes,
cascading into ever more challenging life circumstances. Talent
analytics companies categorized her as a “non-innovator” and “waste.”
With low scores across countless measures, the young woman was
unable to get a full-time job.
To quote Wolff and De-Shalit, “without something like the type of
action plan set out here, societies are destined to continue to reinforce
patterns of entrenched privilege and disadvantage, widening gaps
between rich and poor, and perpetuation of disadvantage.” 164 Michael
Walzer’s social theory also provides a compelling argument against the
“big data’s” promiscuous mashup of various data sources to deny

161. ACLU OF CAL., LOSING THE SPOTLIGHT: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA’S SHINE THE LIGHT LAW
13 (2013), available at http://www.aclunc.org/R2K.
162. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 14
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-changerecommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
163. Tom Risen, Rockefeller Expands Investigation of Consumer Data Brokers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/09/25/rockefellerexpands-investigation-on-consumer-data-brokers.
164. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 186 (2007).
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opportunities. 165 Providing oversight over scoring systems that can cause
negative spirals should be a critical aim of our legal system. Scoring
systems have a powerful allure—their simplicity gives the illusion of
precision and reliability. But predictive algorithms can be anything but
accurate and fair. They can narrow people’s life opportunities in
arbitrary and discriminatory ways.
As a society, we have made commitments to protect consumers from
serious harms that they have no means to prevent. We have also aspired
to provide individuals with notice about important decisions made about
them and a chance to challenge them. These commitments can help us
develop a model of due process for scoring systems. Transparency is a
crucial first step, first to the FTC who can interrogate scoring systems
under their unfairness authority. Opening up the black box scoring
systems to individuals or neutral experts representing them is key to
permitting them to challenge “arbitrariness by algorithm.” Our
recommendations are provisional, yet, we hope the FTC and interested
lawmakers move forward in bringing procedural regularity and oversight
into our scored society.

165. Mike Konczal, Demos on Credit Reporting and Employment; Surveillance, Inequalities and
the Labor Market, RORTYBOMB (June 23, 2011), http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/
2011/06/23/demos-on-credit-reporting-and-employment-surveillance-inequalities-and-the-labormarket/ (“[Walzer suggested that] nobody should be precluded a social good y because on their lack
of possession of an unrelated good x. That the sloppiness of credit scores, the protection of
bankruptcy against bad debts, the brute luck of bad health, etc. could all preclude someone from
obtaining basic utilities and access to productive labor—that inequality in net worth, health and
other spheres preclude access to the sphere of labor regardless of one’s abilities—is something to be
fought tooth-and-nail.”).

